The Fate of the Orchid: How can the end of the 50-year armed conflict change Colombia?

Artist: Laura Goldberg
Artist: Laura Goldberg

In November 1936, botanist Emilio Robledo presented to the Colombian government what would later become the country’s national flower. The Flor de Mayo, May Flower, is a plant belonging to the Orchidaceae family.Most commonly known simply as ‘orchids’ in the South American country, the flower’s petals resemble the three colours of the Colombian flag – yellow, blue and red. Besides their unmistakable beauty, orchids have been used in some countries as medicinal herbs, having the ability to heal deep wounds. While these practices are unheard of in Colombia, deep wounds are still abundant.

On September 23, the world woke up to one of the most awaited headlines. “Colombia Nears a Peace Deal with FARC Rebels,” wrote The New York Times. The Guardian, on the other hand, went with “Colombia Nears Historic Deal after Agreement on Justice and Reparations.” Peace, historic, deal – all these words resounded in the minds of all those expecting news from the ongoing peace talks in Havana, Cuba. On the previous day, President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) leader Rodrigo Londoño, (known by his alias, ‘Timochenko’) shook hands for the first time since the peace process started back in 2012. The government and the FARC had finally agreed on a scheme of transnational justice which would allow for both the state and the guerrillas to confess to major human rights violations and war crimes. Additionally, they set a deadline for signing off all the accords in March 2016, with the FARC handing over their weapons 60 days after the final signature. Truly a breakthrough in what amounts as the longest ongoing armed conflict in the world, the announcement made by both parties in September received important praise from the international community. In Colombia, however, some frowned upon it.

Former president Alvaro Uribe Velez, now senator representing Centro Democratico, the political party he found no more than two years ago, ruthlessly opposes the peace process with the FARC. His father, Alberto Uribe Sierra, a landowner in the Antioquia region, was murdered by FARC members during a kidnap attempt in 1983. During his presidency from 2002 to 2010, as he became the first Colombian President to be re-elected in decades, Uribe Velez’s main policy was known as “democratic security.” This doctrine resulted in strengthening the state’s monopoly of violence by modernizing the country’s army in order to engage, face to face, against the FARC. As Uribe Velez resorted to annihilate the guerrilla group, which he deemed as terrorists, he signed co-operational military and intelligence deals with the United States. During his time in office, Uribe Velez was often associated in major scandals accusing him of strong ties with right-wing paramilitary groups, illegal wiretapping and spying against opposition members. The worst of these episodes involved the so-called falsos positivos, an array of extrajudicial executions carried out by officers of the armed forces who then presented the bodies of dead civilians saying they were FARC members fallen in combat. Nowadays, five years after he handed over the presidency to his former defence minister Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe Velez sits in congress after having helped ensure that his Centro Democratico would become one of the main political forces in Colombia. Santos, his former squire, was elected president with over 60% of the votes in 2010 as he vowed to continue his policies.

However, Santos turned his back to his former master and began to seek secret channels of communication with the FARC as early as 2011. Ever since the announcement of the peace process in 2012, the political spectrum of Colombia seems to have become a dichotomy of power between those who follow Uribe Velez, Uribistas, and those who follow President Santos, Santistas. Those who call themselves Uribistas still believe in a military solution to the armed conflict as Uribe Velez once did, and their arguments in favour are plenty.

Founded in the mid-60’s by a group of leftist revolutionaries, the FARC started out as a rural guerrilla movement that sought to follow in the steps of Cuba’s 26 of July Movement and its leader Fidel Castro. As the decades passed by, the FARC developed at the pace that history set them. In the dusk of the Cold War, as Cuba and the Soviet Union ceased to supply the FARC with financial and military equipment, the guerrilla leaders turned their heads to a rapidly growing and lucrative business – cocaine. While the United States and Europe craved the white powder, the coffers of the FARC began to fill up again. Throughout the 90’s they gained an important military and territorial strength, capturing most of the drug market after the downfall of the traditional drug cartels. Unable to truly take power through arms, they seemed to throw their ideological principles aside to become a quasi-mafia. In the rural areas they terrorised the population, kidnapping army officers and politicians. They stepped up their insurgency and military activity, resulting in terrorist attacks in various cities in Colombia, including the bombing of El Nogal, a renowned elite social club in Bogotá, in 2003. International organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, have accused the FARC of using child soldiers and being the world’s largest planters of landmines. Their constant attacks on the civilians have left a deep wound in the country’s national psyche. And while there is hope of a better future, Colombians ask themselves: how can the end of the 50-year  armed conflict change Colombia?

Former president Andres Pastrana left all by himself after FARC rebels fail to attend to peace meeting in El Caguan in 1999
Former president Andres Pastrana left all by himself after FARC rebels fail to attend to peace meeting in El Caguan in 1999

The key to a peaceful future in Colombia lies in the country’s determination to finally provide its people with a pluralistic democracy. The political elites, the military and insurgent groups such as the FARC have interrupted and halted Colombia’s political development. A toxic combination of oligarchic politics, dependence on the United States and undisrupted violence has paralyzed the country, leaving it to the mercy of a group of only few people. Uribe Velez, Santos, and the remainders of the political class must realize that a successful Colombia should produce instead of depend, develop instead of stagnate, and forgive instead of regret. Allowing for the civilian population to participate more actively in decision-making processes would create an atmosphere where, in the future, demobilized FARC members and Uribistas could sit in the same table. Colombian society will, in time, learn that while deep wounds may not heal with the petals of the orchids, the scars will begin to disappear once their hearts are filled with truly the most important sentiment – forgiveness.

Sergio Calderón-Harker